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THE SACRED FOURTH AMENDMENT TEXT 
Christopher Slobogin* 
Review of Jeffrey Bellin, Fourth Amendment Textualism, 118 MICH. 
L. REV. 233 (2019). 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence governing the Fourth Amendment’s 
“threshold”—a word meant to refer to the types of police actions that trigger 
the amendment’s warrant and reasonableness requirements—has confound-
ed scholars and students alike since Katz v. United States.1 Before that 1967 
decision, the Court’s decisions on the topic were fairly straightforward, 
based primarily on whether the police trespassed on the target’s property or 
property over which the target had control.2 After that decision—which has 
come to stand for the proposition that a Fourth Amendment search occurs if 
police infringe an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize 
as reasonable3—scholars have attempted to define the Amendment’s thresh-
old by reference to history, philosophy, linguistics, empirical surveys, and 
positive law.4 With the advent of technology that more easily records, aggre-
gates, and accesses public activities and everyday transactions, the cacopho-
ny on the threshold issue has grown deafening—especially so after the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Jones5 and Carpenter v. United 
States.6 In these decisions, the Court seemed to backtrack from its previously 
established notions that public travels and personal information held by 
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third parties are not reasonably perceived as private and are therefore not 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.7 
Enter Jeffrey Bellin who, in Fourth Amendment Textualism, attempts to 
simplify and rationalize the law governing when the Fourth Amendment is 
implicated by looking closely at the amendment’s language.8 Professor Bellin 
is not the first author to parse the text of the Fourth Amendment, of course.9 
But his effort is both more detailed and more comprehensive than most, and 
it produces results that, while perhaps not satisfying to everyone, are reason-
able interpretations of both text and history, avoid the morass created by the 
expectation-of-privacy test, and help answer the multiple conundrums that 
have arisen in connection with technologically driven law enforcement in-
vestigations. 
Bellin’s breakdown of the Fourth Amendment’s text comes in three 
parts. First, he tackles the word “search.”10 Like other scholars (and as sug-
gested by Justice Scalia in Kyllo v. United States11), he opts for the com-
monsense definition of that word—that is, “an examination of an object or 
space to uncover information.”12 That definition covers all of the situations 
the Court has denominated as searches. But it does not include casual glanc-
es (no “examination”); interviews of suspects by police or informants (no ex-
amination of “an object or space”); accidental intrusions (no attempt to ob-
obtain “information”); or intentional examinations of something—such as 
the outside of a house or the public travels of a car—that “is already apparent 
through standard visual and audio observation” (i.e., no attempt to “uncov-
er” information).13 
The second component of Bellin’s textual analysis is the Fourth 
Amendment’s reference to “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”14 The word 
“person” is self-defining, but unless police “search” the person (e.g., by going 
through pockets or obtaining a DNA sample), the Fourth Amendment is not 
triggered. To Bellin, observing a person in public is not a search of that per-
son but only a search of a public space.15 Houses include curtilage but not 
barns outside the curtilage.16 Papers must be conscious, written communica-
tions; while that includes electronic as well as paper documents, it excludes 
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oral communications and the pings associated with emails and texts.17 With 
respect to effects, Bellin concludes—here based as much on a review of colo-
nial history as on text—that while all moveable private property is encom-
passed by the term, tangible public property, as well as one’s voice, wireless 
signals, and other intangibles, is not.18 Thus, according to Bellin, Katz 
(which involved bugging a public phone booth) was wrongly decided and 
Title III (the federal electronic-surveillance statute) is not constitutionally 
required, although Bellin notes that the existence of that statute “render[s] 
this gap a theoretical rather than a practical concern.”19 
The final textual element is the word “their” that appears in the Fourth 
Amendment before persons, houses, papers, and effects.20 Consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s third-party doctrine (and in contrast to Carpenter21), 
Bellin concludes that searching for a person’s information in papers pos-
sessed by another—whether a company, friend, or doctor—usually does not 
implicate the Fourth Amendment.22 However, as might have been the case in 
United States v. Miller23 (which involved government accessing Miller’s 
checks and deposit slips from his bank) and is clearly the case with respect to 
personal documents maintained in the Cloud (whether linked through com-
puters, iPhones, or Fitbit watches), sometimes papers in the possession of 
third parties remain the target’s papers.24 
By now, despite this last caveat, the reader may be thinking, “This textu-
alism approach will seriously reduce the scope of the Fourth Amendment, 
beyond even the grudging stance taken by the current Court!” That assump-
tion is probably correct, although one should not overlook arguments in fa-
vor of a more expansive threshold even if one accepts Bellin’s general 
approach. For instance, if a person fills out a form (in writing or electronical-
ly) and transmits it to a third party so that the third party can use it for mu-
tual gain, one could argue that the form and any derivative document are 
still the person’s “papers” on a bailment theory. If an informant not only 
talks to a suspect but examines the contents of his or her home, a search of 
the suspect’s house would seem to have occurred, contrary to the holding in 
Lewis v. United States25 and various other “false friend” cases. If the outside 
of a house, the location of a car, or the location of a person is only “readily 
apparent” to police through the use of technology rather than via “standard 
visual . . . observation,” once again, a search could be said to occur at least 
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when the police use that technology with the intention of uncovering infor-
mation about those items (a result Bellin himself seems to endorse).26 
I do not like many of the outcomes that Bellin’s textualism reaches. And, 
as Professor Caminker ably demonstrates in his insightful essay for Michigan 
Law Review Online,27 both Professor Bellin’s definition of “search” and his 
focus on searches of rather than for the four items mentioned in the Fourth 
Amendment come with their own ambiguities. However, Bellin’s stance 
hews more closely to constitutional language and is more manageable than 
the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test. I have defended that test in 
part because “privacy is a capacious enough concept to accommodate virtu-
ally all of the values commentators have said [the Fourth Amendment] does 
not encompass.”28 Nonetheless, it must be admitted that privacy is a capa-
cious concept and thus subject to multiple interpretations; as Bellin notes, 
“[c]onsistency and predictability are important features of Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine which seeks to guide not just court decisions but police inves-
tigative activity as well.”29 In defining the Fourth Amendment’s threshold, it 
may make sense to cede authority to a more textual, commonsense interpre-
tation of the word “search.” 
At the same time, I don’t think that agreeing with all or most of what 
Bellin says about that threshold means that societal expectations of privacy 
have no relevance to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence or other laws regu-
lating police intrusions. Figuring out the Fourth Amendment’s coverage is 
only half of the battle over regulation of searches and seizures; there is also 
the task of determining when a search or seizure is “reasonable.” That word 
does not have a textual or commonsense meaning and in fact is intentionally 
capacious. For this second stage of Fourth Amendment analysis—which in-
volves figuring out whether a warrant, probable cause, or something less (or 
more) is required—privacy and its associated values can more easily become 
the focal point of analysis as a textual matter. Indeed, I have argued, on pro-
portionality grounds, that assessments of intrusiveness are crucial in decid-
ing the “reasonableness” of a search; for instance, short-term tracking and 
obtaining a single personal datapoint, although searches, might be permissi-
ble on something short of probable cause because they are not very privacy-
invasive.30 And even if the Constitution does not apply at all—as Bellin con-
 
 26. See Bellin, supra note 8, at 258. 
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 29. Bellin, supra note 8, at 281. 
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Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
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SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH 
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cludes is the case with certain instances of electronic surveillance and search-
es of third-party papers, for example31—legislators and agencies surely will 
be driven by privacy concerns in devising subconstitutional rules, as Title III 
illustrates. So even if Bellin’s textualism reigns on the threshold issue, Katz’s 
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